Morality Matters

Morality Matters, but in what way? 

If someone says, “I do not know whether God exists, and I do not know which God is real,” while also believing that some moral truths are objective, that can be perfectly coherent. They may still hold that murder is wrong even if a society approves of it, that child abuse is wrong regardless of cultural acceptance, and that slavery was wrong even when it was legal. In that case, they are not denying moral truth - they are simply uncertain about what ultimately grounds it. Their position is that moral reality exists, even if its source is unresolved.

What becomes shaky is when that same person calls Christians “ignorant” for believing in one God. That criticism only holds if they can explain why their own confidence in objective morality is not also a commitment made without complete proof. Otherwise, they are applying skepticism to belief in God while exempting their own moral convictions from the same level of scrutiny. So the issue is not a strict contradiction, but an inconsistency in standards (this is exactly Paul's argument in Romans 1): uncertainty about God and belief in objective morality can coexist, but dismissing theism while holding unproven moral certainty can reflect uneven reasoning.

Where this tension deepens is at the level of grounding. Secular moral frameworks can explain why we behave morally - through evolution, social contracts, or concern for well-being - but they struggle to fully justify why moral truths are objectively binding in the first place. If someone holds that actions like murdering innocent people, abusing children, enslaving others, exploiting animals (as in strong forms of veganism), or even creating and using AI at all are morally wrong regardless of culture, opinion, or legal status, they are already appealing to a kind of moral reality that goes beyond preference or utility. These are not just widely disliked behaviors - they are treated as things that are truly wrong, even if a society were to approve of them. Without a clear foundation for that kind of universality, their position risks resting on the same kind of commitment they critique in religious belief: a confidence in something real, universal, and binding, without complete proof of its ultimate source.